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THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY?
Edward I. Koch t
I. INTRODUCTION
New York State and New York City, like most states and cities,
elect many of their judges.' These elections can produce good
judges, bad judges, and mediocre judges. Many efforts have been
made to change the City of New York's current system and estab-
lish one of merit-based judicial selection. 2 The State of New York,
however, has successfully moved to a merit-based system for some
positions. For example, New York State Court of Appeals judges
are appointed by the governor.3 The governor must choose from a
short list of well-qualified candidates who are nominated by the
Court of Appeals Nominating Commission.4 That commission is
bipartisan in nature, and the governor may appoint only four of its
twelve members.5 Efforts at constitutional change to unify all New
York courts by appointing judges, instead of electing them, have
not been successful.
I believe that the caliber of judges is not necessarily deter-
mined by the process used in their ascension to the bench. How-
ever, I believe that a merit-based judicial selection system is better
overall. It is far less political and more openly public. Moreover,
there is strong evidence that this appointment system enables more
women and minorities to reach the bench than in the elective
t Partner, Robinson Silverman Pearce Aronsohn & Berman LLP, New York, New
York; 105th Mayor of the City of New York, 1978-1989; Member, U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives (D-N.Y.), 1968-1977; Member, New York City Council, 1966-1968.
1 See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §§ 6(c), 10(a), 13(a), 15(a), 16(h), 17(d).
2 Generally, merit selection is a strategy to select judges "on the basis of ability,
character, training, and experience . .. ." HANDBOOK OF COURT ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT 299 (Steven W. Hays & Cole Blease Graham, Jr. eds., 1993) (internal
citation omitted). Merit selection, or the Missouri Plan, "requires the creation of a
non-partisan nominating board consisting of the chief justice of the state supreme
court, who acts as chairperson, three lawyers elected by the state bar association, and
three laymen ...." Id. (internal citations omitted).
3 See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 2(b)-(e); see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT
ORGANIZATION 1993, at 38-39 (1995). The governor's appointments are confirmed by
the New York State Senate. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 2(e); see also ROBERT A. CARP &
RONALD STIDHAM, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN AMERICA 258 (3d ed. 1996).
4 See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 2(c); see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 80-
83; HANDBOOK OF COURT ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT, supra note 2, at 299.
5 See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 2(d) (1); see also HANDBOOK OF COURT ADMINISTRATION
AND MANAGEMENT, supra note 2, at 299.
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system.6
In New York State, each party'sjudicial convention determines
candidates for the state supreme court judicial elections. Conse-
quently, many of those nominated by the conventions will have
political obligations to the party leaders instrumental in getting
them the party designation. On the other hand, senators in some
states designate the federal district court nominees using a merit-
based judicial selection process. Many conversant with both the
federal and state judiciary would say that the appointment system
used in the federal selection system leads to fewer political obliga-
tions and, overall, attracts more distinguished jurists.
II. MERIT-BASED JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK
When I became Mayor of the City of New York in 1978, I, like
every mayor before me, had absolute power to appoint anyone I
decided worthy to the criminal and family courts.7 The only limita-
tions were constitutional requirements that the appointee must
have been a lawyer for at least ten years and a resident of the City
of New York.'
Mayor Wagner,9 followed by Mayors Lindsay1 ° and Beame,
created a screening, non-meritjudicial selection system. While still
not a merit-based selection system, it was better than that of their
predecessors because qualifying committees were asked to appraise
the proposed candidates' professional qualifications. Nevertheless,
it also happens that each of the three mayors, on at least one occa-
sion during their time in office, rejected the negative rating given
to a particular candidate by the qualifying committee and ap-
pointed him or her anyway. 12 As mayor-elect, I denounced this ac-
6 See, e.g., The Fund for Modem Courts, Inc., The Success of Women and Minori-
ties in Achieving Judicial Office: The Selection Process 32-33 (1985).
7 See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §§ 13(a), 15(a).
8 See id. §§ 13(a), 15(a), 20(a).
9 Robert F. Wagner served as Mayor of the City of New York from 1954 to 1965.
See CITY OF NEW YORK, THE 1994-95 GREEN BOOK: OFFiciAL DIRECTORY OF THE CITy OF
NEW YORK 4 (1994) [hereinafter THE GREEN BOOK].
10 John V. Lindsay served as Mayor of the City of New York from 1966 to 1973. See
id.
11 Abraham D. Beame served as Mayor of the City of New York from 1974 to 1977.
See id.
12 For example, in Mayor Beame's case, after losing the primary in 1977 and
before leaving office, he appointed ten people to fill judicial vacancies. The two com-
mittees authorized to review the candidates' qualifications were the Mayor's Commit-
tee on theJudiciary (to which he appointed all the members) and a committee of The
Association of the Bar of the City of New York. The latter found the ten selections
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tion and announced my intention to not reappoint these
candidates when their terms ended. That self-imposed prohibition
ended with my creation of a merit-based judicial selection system
for the City of New York.
After I was inaugurated, I asked members of my administra-
tion to propose a totally merit-based selection system for the ap-
pointment of judges. I adopted and created by Executive Order
the system that they proposed.13 In this system, the mayor ap-
pointed the Chair of the Mayor's Committee on the Judiciary
("Mayor's Committee") and twelve of its members.14 The two pre-
siding justices of the First and Second Departments of the Appel-
late Division of the State Supreme Court each appointed another
six members, and the deans of various law schools in the city ap-
pointed the other two members on a rotating basis.'" Thus, the
Mayor's Committee had twenty-seven members16 and fewer than
half were appointed by the mayor.
I also made a commitment concerning all reappointments. If
both committees, the Mayor's Committee and The Association of
the Bar of the City of New York ("City Bar Association"), 7 recom-
mended that any sitting judge be reappointed at the end of his or
her term, I would reappoint that person without exception. Simi-
larly, if either of those two committees recommended that a sitting
judge not be reappointed, I would, without exception, follow its
advice.
The most important aspect of the new merit-based judicial se-
lection system was that I, as Mayor, voluntarily waived my rights to
submit names for consideration to the Mayor's Committee. I re-
quested that the Mayor's Committee submit three names to me for
each vacancy.' 8 I retained overall responsibility and accountability
by personally interviewing the three candidates, from which I se-
lected one. If I found none of the three submissions to be satisfac-
tory, I would ask the Mayor's Committee for three more names.
This did not apply to sitting judges where both committees recom-
mended reappointment. If either committee recommended de-
unqualified to sit as criminal or family court judges, but Mayor Beame appointed
them anyway.
13 Exec. Order No. 10 (Apr. 11, 1978).
14 Id. The Mayor's Committee on the Judiciary nominates candidates for criminal,
civil, and family courts. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUsTICE, supra note 3, at 82-83.
15 Exec. Order No. 10, § 5 (Apr. 11, 1978).
16 Id.
17 An unofficial arrangement, started by mayors before me, allows the City Bar
Association to evaluate judicial candidates.
18 See Exec. Order No. 10, § 2(d) (Apr. 11, 1978).
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nial of the reappointment, the vacancy would be filled in the above
way.19 I also directed that anyone who wanted to be ajudge could
apply directly to the Mayor's Committee and ask for a hearing on
his or her request for appointment.2 ° In addition, the Mayor's
Committee was authorized to seek candidates.21
I believe my appointments to the family and criminal courts
enormously raised the caliber of the judiciary in those courts. This
quality was affirmed by Governors Carey22 and Cuomo 21 when they
selected many of my appointees to serve as New York State Court of
Claims judges. A further indication of the quality of my appoint-
ments was the selection of many of these individuals by the judicial
convention to become candidates for the New York State Supreme
Court. The convention is a highly political candidate selection pro-
cess. This merit-based judicial selection system was continued by
Mayor Dinkins24 without change, and by Mayor Giuliani 25 for a
brief period.
I served as the Mayor of New York City for twelve years, from
1978 to 1989. Since the terms of both criminal and family court
judges are ten years, all ten of Mayor Beame's original non-quali-
fied candidates came up for reappointment during my third
term.2 6 When that happened, despite my original intention not to
reappoint them, I abided by the decisions of the two committees to
reappoint without exception. Those committees recommended
that about one-half of the original ten be reappointed and that the
others not be reappointed. I adhered to their decisions.
Indeed, there were other occasions when both committees
recommended that individuals not be reappointed. Often judges
were highly regarded by other members of the judiciary, who asked
me to override the committees' recommendations. I never did. If
the mayor had knowledge concerning a candidate or someone
seeking reappointment, it would have been perfectly proper for
him or her to bring the information to the attention of his or her
19 Id. § 2(e).
20 Id. § 2(b).
21 Id. § 2(a).
22 Hugh L. Carey served as Governor of the State of New York from 1975 to 1982.
See THE GREEN BOOK, supra note 9, at 367.
23 Mario M. Cuomo served as Governor of the State of New York from 1983 to
1994. See THE GREEN BOOK, supra note 9, at 367.
24 David N. Dinkins served as Mayor of the City of New York from 1990 to 1993. See
THE GREEN BOOK, supra note 9, at 4.
25 Rudolph W. Giuliani took office as Mayor of the City of New York in 1994. See
THE GREEN BooK, supra note 9, at 4.
26 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 1:457460
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committees. However, under my "procedure" once the commit-
tees made a recommendation on reappointment, the mayor would
accept and implement it.
I should point out that it is often a painful decision not to
reappoint judges, particularly when, as is often the case, they and
their friends importune you to change your mind. However, if a
mayor wishes to claim the judicial system is non-political and totally
meritorious, such decisions are a necessary part of the process.
My original Executive Order on reappointments directed the
Mayor's Committee to "[e]valuate the qualifications of each incum-
bent judge for reappointment to judicial office and report the
committee's recommendation to the Mayor, provided that if the
committee shall recommend against reappointment it shall nomi-
nate three candidates for appointment to the resulting vacancy as
provided above."2 7 However, Mayor Giuliani issued a revised provi-
sion on reappointments.28 Through this revision, the Mayor gave
himself the authority to deny reappointment to a sitting judge,
even if the Mayor's Committee had recommended reappointment,
and to direct the Mayor's Committee to propose three new
candidates.
27 Exec. Order No. 10, § 2(e) (Apr. 11, 1978).
28 Exec. Order No. 10 (July 20, 1994). This section of the Executive Order now
reads in its entirety:
Section 2. Functions. The Committee shall:
(a) Recruit and receive from any source the names of candidates ap-
pearing to have the highest qualifications for judicial office;
(b) Evaluate and conduct all necessary inquiry to determine those persons
whose character, ability, training, experience, temperament and com-
mitment to equal justice under law fully qualify them for judicial office;
(c) Consider all relevant information to determine which of the fully
qualified candidates are best qualified for judicial office, and refer to the
Department of Investigation for screening all persons the Committee proposes to
nominate for appointment;
(d) Nominate and present to the Mayor three candidates for appointment
to each vacant judicial office, except that if there are numerous vacan-
cies the Committee, in its discretion, may present less than three nomina-
tions (unless the Mayor requests three nominations) for each vacancy,
and provide such information as may be necessary to inform the Mayor
of the qualifications of each nominee; and
(e) Evaluate the qualifications of each incumbent judge for reappoint-
ment to judicial office and present the Committee's recommendation to
the Mayor, provided that either at the request of the Mayor, or if the Com-
mittee shall recommend against reappointment of an incumbent, the Com-
mittee shall nominate and present to the Mayor three candidates for
appointment to the resulting vacancy other than the incumbent.
Id. (emphasis added to amended text).
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III. THE INDEPENDENCE OF JUDGES SCHWARTZWALD, KAY, AND
FREEDMAN?
Early in Mayor Giuliani's administration, I received a call from
his counsel, Dennison Young, who told me that the Mayor was con-
sidering reducing the Mayor's Committee from the existing twenty-
seven members to nineteen. He wanted to know my opinion. I
told him that I thought it was a bad idea; the system was not broken
and there was no need to fix it. He raised no other change with
me.
Subsequently, Mayor Giuliani announced that he was not
reappointing Judges Eugene Schwartzwald andJerome Kay, two of
the original ten criminal court judges appointed by Mayor Beame,
and whom I reappointed, and who had been recommended for
reappointment by the two committees for the second time. I im-
mediately criticized Mayor Giuliani for rejecting the recommenda-
tions of the committees.
29
Mayor Giuliani denounced those of us who criticized his ac-
tions, including Judith Kaye, Chief Judge of the New York State
Court of Appeals."0 Judge Kaye met with Mayor Giuliani when the
Mayor announced he was rejecting the committees' recommenda-
tions, and asked him to reappoint both judges to full ten-year
terms. When she publicly criticized Mayor Giuliani's decision, he,
in turn, "criticized her for criticizing him, saying she had over-
stepped her bounds."31 Furthermore, the New York Law Journal re-
ported that "[o]ne court administrator, angered by the way the
reappointments had been handled, said, '[n]o one in the mayor's
office' can point to 'any complaints about (the judges') work per-
formance.' The administrator added that failure to reappoint the
two 'destroys the whole idea of a non-political merit appointment
process.'"82
29 David Firestone, Koch and Dinkins Denounce Mayor in a Feud Over Judges, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 23, 1995, at 29 ("[Flormer Mayor Edward I. Koch called the decision
'scandalous' and 'calamitous,' and said he could never endorse a candidate for mayor
who had injected politics into the courtroom.").
30 David Firestone, Giuliani and Ex-Mayors Intensify Battle over Judicial Denotions, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 28, 1995, at Al.
31 Id.
32 Daniel Wise & Matthew Goldstein, Mayor's Action on Judges Stirs Dissent, N.Y.L.J.,
Dec. 26, 1995, at 1 [hereinafter Wise & Goldstein, Mayor's Action]. Moreover, as the
New York Law Journal further pointed out, Mayor Giuliani "may not have followed his
own procedure for naming judges to replace [Schwartzwald and Kay]." Matthew
Goldstein & Daniel Wise, Process Used by GiulianiforJudges Is Questioned, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 5,
1996, at 1.
Seven months after taking office, the Mayor issued an executive or-
[Vol. 1:457
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In support of his decision, Mayor Giuliani announced that his
standards were higher than those of the committees. 3 He further
stated he would exercise those standards in overruling the commit-
tees in these two cases and where appropriate in the future because
he wanted judges of the very highest quality.34 At a press confer-
ence, Mayor Giuliani attacked former Mayor Dinkins and me and
accused both of our administrations of making political appoint-
ments to the bench. 5 Later in the press conference, he stated that
"[former Mayor] Dinkins and [former Mayor] Koch reappointed 'a
significant number of Democratic machine politicians despite their
hypocritical allegiance to some pristine process.' ''3 6 Mayor Giu-
liani then added that his process was a way to protect himself politi-
cally.3 7 Moreover, he stated that former Mayor Dinkins and I used
our process in an "under the table"3 8 manner, then added "I know
that went on .... 3 9 Mayor Giuliani then held up a copy of City for
Sale,40 a book written by two reporters who were hostile to me dur-
ing my administration. Mayor Giuliani twice repeated a partial line
from the book about "[t]he Koch collapse on judicial selection."41
The New York Times columnist Joyce Purnick later pointed out that
Mayor Giuliani failed to note "that the reference was to a different
der that altered the process for reappointing incumbent judges and
gave himself somewhat greater latitude than his two predecessors.
The provision in the July 20, 1994, order gave the Mayor authority
to ask his Advisory Committee on the Judiciary to provide him with the
names of three qualified candidates to succeed an incumbent judge in
the event he decided not to reappoint a sitting judge, even if the com-
mittee had recommended reappointment of the sitting judge. Accord-
ing to City Hall officials, no additional names were requested to replace
the two demoted judges, Eugene Schwartzwald and Jerome M. Kay.
The Mayor's counsel, Dennison Young, Jr., said the new language
was added "to try to enhance the quality of the judiciary." But Mr.
Young vigorously disputed that the change obligated the Mayor to re-
quest three new names and asserted that the Mayor already had an ade-
quate number of candidates before him when he made his choice.
Id.
33 Don Van Natta, Jr., Giuliani's Choice for Judge: A Question of Experience, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 30, 1995, at 29.
34 Firestone, supra note 29, at 29 ("Mr. Giuliani . . . said that if anything he
planned to remove more sitting judges from the bench when their terms ended
.... ").
35 Firestone, supra note 29, at 29.
36 Joyce Purnick, Heeding Only His Own Gave4 A Mayor Pays, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28,
1995, at B1.
37 Firestone, supra note 29, at 29.
38 Firestone, supra note 29, at 29.
39 Firestone, supra note 29, at 29.
40 JACK NEWFIELD & WAYNE BARRErr, CITY FOR SALE (1988).
41 Id. at 172.
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process and court-a 1979 nomination for the [New York] State
Supreme Court, an elective position unrelated to the Koch judicial
screening committee, and his own judicial appointments."42
An inference could be drawn from Mayor Giuliani's state-
ments that, as a U.S. Attorney,43 he had access to confidential infor-
mation. There was a false implication that I lied when I said I
never recommended anyone to the Mayor's Committee. If in fact I
did what Mayor Giuliani implied, then it would mean that twenty-
seven members of the Mayor's Committee, most of them outstand-
ing lawyers with great reputations, were part of a conspiracy. This
would include David Trager, the Chairman of the Mayor's Commit-
tee during my last eight years in office. Mr. Trager also served as
the Dean of Brooklyn Law School, was a former U.S. Attorney, and
now sits as a federal judge. Moreover, the conspiracy would also
include all the members of the judicial committee of the City Bar
Association. Furthermore, how could I send anyone to the Mayor's
Committee for evaluation without actually intending an evaluation
to occur? Had there been a conspiracy, would not a number of the
several dozen lawyers involved have broken ranks and confirmed
the Mayor's false, cowardly, and unprofessional statements?
Suffice it to say that the two persons appointed by Mayor Giu-
liani do not appear to bear out his stated reason for the appoint-
ments, that they were far superior to those whom they were
replacing. It now seems, according to The New York Times, that the
Mayor's first replacement, Charles A. Posner, had "very little court-
room experience, having tried just seven cases in his six years as a
top aide" to Brooklyn District Attorney Joe Hynes.44 Mayor Giu-
liani's other replacement, Robert Torres, according to The New
York Times, "flunked out of Brooklyn Law School twice and never
earned a law degree but became a lawyer by studying on his own
and passing the bar exam."45 The New York Times further stated that
Judge Torres had unsuccessfully applied for a seat on the bench
before three other committees:' Governor Cuomo's, Mayor
Dinkins', and mine. With all due deference to Judge Torres,
Mayor Giuliani's comparing him, as he did, to Abraham Lincoln is
42 Purnick, supra note 36, at B1.
43 Rudolph W. Giuliani served as the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of
New York from 1983 to 1989. See CHIS McNicKLE, To BE MAYOR OF NEW YORK: ETHNIC
POLITICS IN THE CITY 296-99 (1993).
44 Don Van Natta, Jr., Giuliani Judicial Selection Passed the Bar Exam Despite Lacking a
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a bit of a stretch.47 It is amusing that Mayor Giuliani would refer to
the suggestion that a prospective judge should have graduated
from law school as "elitist criteria. "48
Following Mayor Giuliani's announcement of his replace-
ments, I immediately wrote to every member of his Mayor's Com-
mittee and urged them to resign if the Mayor did not recant this
change in the merit-based judicial selection system. Of the twenty-
seven members, only Paul Curran, Chairman of the Mayor's Com-
mittee, replied. He, in high dudgeon and defending the Mayor's
position, criticized me in a letter, saying "it is unassailable that the
Mayor's decisions as to Judges Kay and Schwartzwald were not
based upon partisan political considerations. I regret I cannot say
the same for your letter to me." 49 President Kennedy said "loyalty
sometimes demands too much."5
I must confess, I thought there would be a rallying of support
for my position. When that did not occur and lawyers stood mute,
I felt quite alone. It was not until The New York Times spoke out in a
brilliant editorial" that I felt there was still a chance to convince
the public that what Mayor Giuliani had done was absolutely
wrong, and perhaps even see the Mayor correct the error. When
Mayor Giuliani overruled the two independent judicial panels' rec-
ommendations that both Judges Schwartzwald and Kay be reap-
pointed, The New York Times wrote that "[t]he argument shifted
from a debate about the quality ofjudges to the fitness of Mr. Giu-
liani as judicial arbiter."52 The New York Times editorial went on:
Mayor Edward Koch voluntarily relinquished enormous pa-
tronage power when he created an independent panel to review
judicial candidates .... It was one of Mr. Koch's great achieve-
ments, and Mayor Giuliani's refusal to acknowledge that during
this spitting match is a stark example of his worst failure as a
leader - the compulsion to demonize everyone who disagrees
with him.53
47 See id.; see also David Seifman, Hizzoner Plays the Shrink, N.Y. PosT, Jan. 3, 1996, at
3.
48 Van Natta, Jr., supra note 44, at B3.
49 Letter from PaulJ. Curran, Chairman, Mayor's Advisory Committee on the Judi-
ciary, to Hon. Edward I. Koch, Partner, Robinson Silverman Pearce Aronsohn &
Berman LLP (Dec. 26, 1995) (copy on file with the New York City Law Review).
50 This quote has been attributed to President Kennedy. See Albert R. Hunt, People
& Politics: Clinton's Final Campaign Hurrah, and Two Who Deserve to Lose, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 31, 1996, at A23 ('John F. Kennedy: 'Party loyalty sometimes demands too
much."').
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Putting to rest the issue of my alleged political appointments, The
New York Times' editorial stated that "Mr. Giuliani and his aides sug-
gested, with no evidence whatsoever, that Mayors Koch and Dinkins
had practiced behind-the-scenes politics to influence the process
and reward loyal Democrats with judgeships."54
When The New York Times' editorial was followed by an equally
scathing editorial in Crain's New York Business, 5 I thought there was
indeed hope that Mayor Giuliani would be held responsible for
destroying the merit-based judicial selection system, by replacing it
with a political system that allows him to determine with absolute
unchecked authority who should be reappointed. Crain's New York
Business stated, "Mr. Giuliani's virulent reaction [to his critics] is
part of a pattern of disparagement that he heaps upon his critics
and opponents. Adversaries must not merely be overcome, they
must be pulverized."5 6
In 1995, Mayor Giuliani denied Judge Eugene Schwartzwald
reappointment to the criminal court and instead appointed him to
a one year interim civil court judgeship.5 7 At the swearing-in cere-
mony, Judge Schwartzwald refused to shake the Mayor's hand.58 In
December 1996, the Mayor's Committee apparently found Judge
Schwartzwald's refusal to shake the Mayor's hand indicative of a
lack of judicial temperament. News reports conveyed that the
Mayor's Committee recommended against Mayor Giuliani provid-
ing Judge Schwartzwald with another interim civil court appoint-
ment because of that incident.59 I concurred with the Mayor's
Committee's decision, publicly saying thatJudge Schwartzwald's re-
fusal to shake the Mayor's hand "showed a lack ofjudicial tempera-
ment."60 I drew a distinction between Mayor Giuliani making the
decision not to reappoint Judge Schwartzwald, for his own political
reasons, and the Mayor accepting the decision of the Mayor's
Committee.
Under the New York State Constitution, anyjudicial appointee
54 Id. (emphasis added).
55 Alair Townsend, Editorial, By Demonizing Dissenters, Rudy Risks Retribution, Throt-
tles Debate, CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus., Jan. 8-14, 1996, at 9.
56 Id.
57 Susan Rubinowitz & Devlin Barrett, Axed Judge: Rudy Didn't Give Me Fair Shake,
N.Y. POST, Dec. 28, 1996, at 3.
58 David Firestone, At Swearing-In Ceremony, A Judge Snubs the Mayor, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 29, 1995, at B3.
59 See Rubinowitz & Barrett, supra note 57, at 3; see also Joel Siegel, Veteran Judge
Dismissed by Mayor's Panel, DAILY NEWS (New York), Dec. 11, 1996, at 22.
60 Rubinowitz & Barrett, supra note 57, at 3.
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must be "well [-] qualified."61 One must assume that both judicial
committees are aware of that requirement. In fact, I know that the
City Bar Association is aware of it because its former president, Bar-
bara Paul Robinson, brought it to my attention. Ms. Robinson told
me that if the Mayor wanted to raise the standards for any judicial
appointment, there would be no question that the City Bar Associa-
tion would oblige him.
Ms. Robinson also showed me an unpublished op-ed article
submitted to The New York Times wherein she wrote:
While the standards should be sufficiently high to approve only
well [-]qualified incumbents, once met, incumbent judges
should be re-appointed. Otherwise, there is a real danger that,
at the very least, there will be an appearance of politics intrud-
ing into the decisions of the courts.... A judge who had been
approved by both judiciary committees should not have to worry
whether a particular mayor will find them appropriate for re-
appointment.6
2
Additionally, Ms. Robinson responded to written questions I
had concerning the Mayor's changes in the judicial selection pro-
cess and the City Bar Association's role in that process. The follow-
ing are excerpts from her reply:
First, I can confirm that the [City Bar Association] was not
consulted about any changes made to the relevant executive or-
der. While we did respond to certain changes in the language
regarding diversity, we did not comment on any other
changes....
As you know, our Judiciary Committee evaluates all candi-
dates forjudicial office in our city .... As I told you, our Judici-
ary Committee applies the same standards to all candidates it
reviews and I provided you a copy of the relevant language....
The Mayor had not asked our Committee on the Judiciary
to review or upgrade its standards. However, the Mayor's recent
decision not to re-appoint two incumbent judges who had been
approved by both his and our Judiciary Committees and the en-
suing controversy presented us with an opportunity to meet with
the Mayor and his advisors to discuss our concerns. We sug-
gested that we work cooperatively together to review the stan-
dards being applied by both Committees to be sure that only
61 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 2(c). While the New York State Constitution specifies only
that appointees to the New York State Court of Appeals be "well [-] qualified," id., the
City Bar Association applies this standard to all appointees.
62 Barbara Paul Robinson on merit selection and the New York Cityjudicial selec-
tion process 2 (Jan. 28, 1996) (unpublished op-ed article, on file with the New York
City Law Review).
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those candidates found "well-qualified" were approved, the stan-
dard required by the State Constitution. We agree with you that
the re-appointment of incumbent judges raises special concerns
about judicial independence ....
Whenever an appointing authority appoints someone who
has been disapproved by [ ]our Judiciary Committee, we do
speak out publicly and expect to continue to do so. We also
publicize our approvals and disapprovals of all candidates we re-
view who participate in judicial [ ]elections. Finally, you asked
whether we would support a change in the law to require the
Mayor to submit all nominees to the City Council for it to [ ]"ad-
vise and consent[."] We have never considered such a proposal
so we have no position at the present time. Naturally, we would
expect to review the specifics of any such proposal before we
could do so. Thanks to the process you established, candidates
for mayoral appointment who have been disapproved by ourJu-
diciary Committee have not been appointed to the bench.
Thank you again for everything you have done and con-
tinue to do to protect the integrity and independence of the
[ ]judiciary.6"
In my opinion, if Mayor Giuliani wants to raise judicial stan-
dards, all he has to do is direct the committees to raise theirs. By
substituting his judgment for theirs, as Gary Brown, Executive Di-
rector of The Fund for Modem Courts, Inc. said, "[it] may very
well have a chilling effect on judges .... I
It is interesting, and disappointing, that so many lawyers have
chosen to remain silent, undoubtedly fearful of Mayor Giuliani's
vindictiveness. One well-known lawyer recently told me that he was
glad I stood up to the Mayor and spoke out. I replied, "[i]t would
be even better if you did." Another equally prominent lawyer told
me that he would have spoken out, but due to his position with an
organization receiving funds from the city, he did not because he
was afraid the Mayor would cut off the funding.
Most lawyers are familiar with the 1866 saying of a New York
State Surrogate, to wit, "[n]o man's life, liberty, or property are
safe while the legislature is in session."6 5 I think this sentiment is
probably still true. I believe that it could also apply to the same
extent to mayors and chief executives alike. It is also still true that
63 Letter from Barbara Paul Robinson, then President, Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, to Hon. Edward I. Koch, Partner, Robinson Silverman Pearce
Aronsohn & Berman LLP (Feb. 9, 1996) (copy on file with the New York City Law
Review).
64 See Wise & Goldstein, Mayor's Action, supra note 32, at 1.
65 Estate of A.B., 1 Tuck. 247, 249 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1866).
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our recourse is through the courts. Only if we are certain that the
courts are not politically dominated and only if we are certain that
nominations to those courts are outside the political process can
we, while the legislature is in session, sleep without fear. Regretta-
bly, that is not the case in New York. It was true in the City of New
York in the appointment of criminal and family courtjudges under
the merit-based selection system I created, but it is no longer true
under the procedures used by Mayor Rudolph Giuliani. Recently,
the public danger created by Mayor Giuliani's rescission of auto-
matic reappointment for sitting judges was vividly illustrated. In
McCain v. Giuliani,66 The Legal Aid Society's Homeless Family
Rights Project (the "Project") won its case at trial by establishing
that the city had violated both law and court orders in processing
homeless families seeking housing. The Project was required to go
to the appellate division after the city filed a notice of appeal. If
this case simply involved an appeal by the city, as is its right, no one
could fault the Giuliani Administration. However, the Mayor went
far beyond the filing of the notice of appeal, and undertook to
personally attack Judge Helen Freedman with his demeaning lan-
guage, a deplorable and dangerous action.6 7
During the Dinkins and Giuliani Administrations, Judge
Freedman imposed fines totalling $5 million against the city for
disobeying her orders in this ongoing matter.68 The City of New
York faces another $1 million in penalties, currently stayed on ap-
peal.69 Understandably angered, the Mayor viciously and person-
ally attacked Judge Freedman, saying, "[s] he [is not] ruling on the
law, [she is] ruling on her own personal ideology."7 However, if
that were true, she would be reversed on appeal. Mayor Giuliani,
according to the New York Post, said that Judge Freedman has been
issuing "irrational orders" to mayors for thirteen years and that "[it
is] about time she step aside. Any judge that holds a case for a
decade or more should get off the case because what happens is
they become the purveyors of policy rather than deciders of cases
that come before them."71
66 N.Y.L.J., May 16, 1996, at 28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 14, 1996), affd, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 14,
1997, at 29 (N.Y. App. Div. Feb. 11, 1997).
67 Mike Pearl & David Seifman, 'Workfare'Judge Ought to Quit: Rudy, N.Y. POST, Aug.
21, 1996, at 5.
68 See Matthew Goldstein, City Held in Contempt Again for Keeping Homeless in Office,
N.Y.L.J., May 15, 1996, at 1.
69 Id.
70 Pearl & Seifman, supra note 67, at 5.
71 Pearl & Seifman, supra note 67, at 5.
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Mayor Giuliani also asserted that Steven Banks, The Legal Aid
Society's coordinating attorney in McCain, "[b]y and large controls
her ideology because she constantly rules his way."' 72 Was the
Mayor suggesting collusion between Mr. Banks and Judge Freed-
man with impeachment and disbarment proceedings in the offing?
In this particular instance, Mayor Giuliani is facing a New York
State Supreme Court justice who, because she is elected, does not
have to rely upon a chief executive's generosity of spirit to be reap-
pointed at the end of her term, and cannot be terrorized. How-
ever, there are many who do rely upon this generosity, particularly
criminal and family court judges, who are often appointed to pre-
side as acting supreme courtjustices. Surely, some judges would be
fearful of Mayor Giuliani and his implied and expressed threats
that they will not be reappointed unless they meet his standards
regardless of the evaluations given by the Mayor's Committee and
the City Bar Association. What would such a message convey to
Judge Freedman if she were an appointed judge, that is, a criminal
or family court judge presiding as an "acting" New York State
Supreme Court judge?
On February 11, 1997, the appellate division affirmed Judge
Freedman's ruling holding the Mayor and the city in contempt.73
Imagine what the consequences would be for Judge Freedman if
she needed Mayor Giuliani's consent for her reappointment.
The Mayor's vicious personal attacks on the judiciary go far
beyond responsible criticism, which is always legitimate. He is seek-
ing to place judges in a state of fear, making a government of men,
not of laws. This brings to mind a quote from Shakespeare's Julius
Caesar: "Upon what meat doth this our Caesar feed, that he is
grown so great?"74 The City of New York is the number one litigant
in the civil and criminal courts of this city. Do we want our judges
to succumb to the extralegal pressures of the Mayor?
IV. THE INDEPENDENCE OF JUDGES BAER, FRIEDMAN, AND CHIN?
In several cases, Governor Pataki7" and President Clinton76
72 Pearl & Seifman, supra note 67, at 5.
73 McCain v. Giuliani, N.Y.LJ., Feb. 14, 1997, at 29 (N.Y. App. Div. Feb. 11, 1997).
74 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF JULIUS CAESAR act 1, sc. 2, In. 149-50
(Sylvan Barnet ed., Signet Classic 1987).
75 George E. Pataki took office as Governor of the State of New York in 1995. See
THE GREEN BOOK, supra note 9, at 367.
76 William J. Clinton took office as President of the United States in 1993. See THE
GREEN BOOK, supra note 9, at 459.
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joined the Mayor in criticizing judges and threatening the inde-
pendence of the judiciary. One such case involving U.S. District
Court Judge Harold Baer, Jr., who serves in the Southern District
of New York, received nationwide attention.77 In United States v.
Bayless,78 Judge Baer invalidated a police investigative stop79 where
police recovered thirty-four kilograms of cocaine and two kilo-
grams of heroin."0 In Bayless, a plainclothes police officer testified
that at approximately 5:00 a.m., he and his partner observed Carol
Bayless drive her rented 1995 Caprice, fitted with Michigan license
plates, "slowly along 176th Street. Before reaching the intersection
of 176th Street and St. Nicholas Avenue [Bayless] pulled over to
the north side of the street and double parked the car."81 He fur-
ther testified that
once the car stopped, four men emerged from between parked
cars on the south side of the street. The males crossed the street
walking single file, [Bayless] leaned over to the passenger side of
the car and pushed the button for the trunk release. The first
male then lifted the trunk open, the second and third males
each placed a large black duffel bag into the trunk and the
fourth male closed the trunk.82
Police did not observe any conversation between any of the
four men.83 Bayless drove away and the police followed.84 At a
stoplight, two of the four males, who were standing nearby, recog-
nized the police officers.8 5 At that time, all four males "moved in
different directions at a rapid gait."" After the stoplight turned
green, the officers continued to follow Bayless. 7 The officer testi-
fied that in order to prevent Bayless from entering a major highway
and before they could "run a [computer] check,"8 they pulled
Bayless over.89 He testified that they pulled Bayless over because
they observed that
the car had an out-of-town license plate; the actions of the four
77 Al Guart, Judge Throws Out $4M Drug Bust Seizure on Technicality, N.Y. PosT, Jan.
25, 1996, at 4.
78 913 F. Supp. 232, vacated, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
79 Id. at 239.
80 Id. at 234.





86 Id. (quoting police officer's testimony).
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 235-36.
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males, particularly the way they crossed the street in single file
and did not speak with the driver of the car; the fact that the
males ran once they noticed the officers; and the duffel bags the
males placed in the trunk of the car.
90
After police stopped Bayless, they looked in the trunk of her car,91
wherein they found thirty-four kilograms of cocaine and two kilo-
grams of heroin.92 Bayless was arrested at the scene.93
After her arrest, Bayless made a videotaped statement. 94 Bay-
less' "version of the events surrounding her arrest differ[ed] signif-
icandy from that recounted by [the police]."9 In her videotaped
confession, Bayless admitted driving from Detroit to New York with
$1 million in the trunk in order to pick up drugs.96 Bayless further
admitted she made the same trip to buy drugs more than twenty
times since 1991. 97 For this trip, Bayless expected to be paid
$20,000 by her son.98 Judge Baer found that Bayless' "candor and
the nature of her statements [gave] her statement great credibil-
ity."99 Judge Baer opined, "I place considerable weight on the de-
fendant's statements because of how they incriminate her, her son
and others and because at the time the statements were made, de-
fendants, unlike the [o]fficer, had no reason to color the facts."100
Following the suppression hearing, at which Bayless did not
testify,10 1 Judge Baer chose not to believe the police officer's sworn
testimony that the men loading duffel bags into Bayless' trunk ran
when they spotted the police officers.10 2 Rather, Judge Baer sup-
pressed the seized narcotics and Bayless' videotaped confession.10 3
In granting Bayless' motion to suppress, Judge Baer stated:
Even before this prosecution and the public hearing and final
report of the Mollen Commission, residents in [Washington
90 Id. at 236.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 234.




97 Id. at 237.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 236.
100 Id. at 239.
101 During the suppression hearing, "defense counsel notified the court that [Bay-
less] was ill with a stomach ailment and needed to be removed from the courtroom.
[Bayless] waived her right to be present at the remainder of the proceedings." Id. at
236 n.8.
102 Id. at 239 ("[tlhe testimony offered by [the police officer] ... is at best
suspect.").
103 Id. at 243.
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Heights] tended to regard police officers as corrupt, abusive
and violent.... [Hiad the men not run when the cops began to stare
at them, it would have been unusual.1
0 4
He further added, "[w] hat I find shattering is that in this day and
age blacks in black neighborhoods and blacks in white neighbor-
"1105hoods can count on little security for their person.
For most of the country, Judge Baer's decision flew in the face
of common sense. In order to sustain a police officer's investiga-
tive stop and search of Bayless' car trunk, Judge Baer had to find
that the officers had a "'reasonable suspicion' supported by articul-
able facts that criminal activity 'may be afoot.' "106 Judge Baer's de-
cision is laden with evidence that demonstrates an appalling anti-
law enforcement bias. For example, he tortured the facts and cir-
cumstances in order to conclude that the police lacked the requi-
site "reasonable suspicion" to support their stop; his out-of-hand
rejection of the police officer's testimony based upon the state-
ment of a defendant never subjected to cross-examination; and his
statement that the men were correct to run when they saw the po-
lice. In a final stroke, Judge Baer branded the U.S. Attorney's ef-
forts to have him reconsider the suppression motion "a juvenile
project. "107
President Clinton's spokesman, Michael D. McCurry, called
Judge Baer's decision "wrongheaded"1 8 and said that "the White
House was waiting to see what happened in the hearing being con-
ducted by Judge Baer [and urged by President Clinton]109 and left
open the possibility that Mr. Clinton might ask the judge to step
down."11 ° Mayor Giuliani called the ruling "mind-boggling in its
effect"11" ' and further stated that he "read the decision twice....
There [was] no basis for it."112 Governor Pataki joined the criti-
cism, saying through his spokesman, "[t] his sadly is too often what
happens when liberal elites in powerful positions treat the
104 Id. at 242 (emphasis added).
105 Id. at 240.
106 Id. (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968)).
107 Don Van Natta, Jr., Judge to Hear Bid to Reverse a Drug Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3,
1996, at 25.
108 Alison Mitchell, Clinton Defends His Criticism of a New York Judge's Ruling, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 3, 1996, at A12.
109 Alison Mitchell, Clinton Pressing Judge to Relent, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1996, at Al.
110 Mitchell, supra note 108, at A12.
111 Clifford Krauss, Giuliani and Bratton Assail U.S. Judge's Ruling in Drug Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 1996, at 25.
112 Id.
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criminals as victims and victims as criminals."11 3
Under obvious intense public pressure,Judge Baer heard rear-
gument of the original suppression motion and overruled his first
decision." 4 Perhaps he acted out of fear of inevitable condemna-
tion by editorials, as well as concern that President Clinton would
call for his resignation. Judge Baer would have been better off-
and more intellectually honest and better preserving of his good
reputation-had he urged the U.S. Attorney to appeal his first de-
cision to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, or, in the alterna-
tive, recuse himself from the argument on rehearing, allowing
another judge to decide the issue.115
In another widely reported state criminal court case, Criminal
Court Justice David Friedman ruled evidence collected in a Brook-
lyn rape case inadmissible because police conducted their search
after nine p.m. ' 16 Under New York law, "[a] search warrant may be
executed on any day of the week. It may be executed only between
the hours of 6:00 [a.m.] and 9:00 [p.m.], unless the warrant ex-
pressly authorizes execution thereof at any time of the day or
night."117 In fact,Justice Friedman later discovered the search was
executed at approximately six p.m."8 The Brooklyn District Attor-
ney's Office was delinquent in not refuting the defense counsel's
allegation that the search warrant was executed after nine p.m.
Subsequent to his original decision, and after pointing out the de-
fense counsel's error, Justice Friedman reversed his decision and
113 Greg B. Smith & Frank Lombardi, Rudy, Gov Hit Judge for Axing Drug Case, Jan.
26, 1996, DAILY NEWS (New York), at 4.
114 United States v. Bayless, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). At the initial hear-
ing, the government put forth the testimony of only one of the officers involved in
Bayless' arrest. Id. at 214. Judge Baer noted that upon rehearing, the government
brought forth the "other officer who observed the events at issue here, [and] also the
report he prepared hours after the arrest .... " Id. at 215. After the rehearing, Judge
Baer found that the second officer "corroborated several significant portions of [his
partner's] story and presented a more credible chronology of the events of April
21st." Id. Judge Baer added that "as a consequence of the defendant's testimony and
that of the [second officer], her story is now less convincing." Id. at 216.
115 Before Bayless' case went to trial, she made motion under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) to
have Judge Baer recuse himself. See United States v. Bayless, 926 F. Supp. 405
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). Judge Baer denied Bayless' motion. Id. at 406. However, Judge Baer
removed himself from the case to avoid "unnecessary and otherwise avoidable
problems and attendant delays," id., and ordered a new judge for trial. Id.
116 See People v. Gardner, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 1, 1996, at 32 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 25, 1996);
see also Anthony M. DeStafano & Paul Moses, Ruling Raises a Searching Question, NEWS-
DAY (New York), Feb. 2, 1996, at A4.
117 N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 690.30(2) (McKinney 1995).
118 DeStafano & Moses, supra note 116, at A4.
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ruled that the seized evidence could be admitted.1"' Justice Fried-
119 On February 6, 1996, Justice Friedman, ruling from the bench, modified his
January 25th order, and denied suppression of evidence recovered by police in the
execution of their warrant. No formal opinion was written. What appears below is a
transcript of the statement read on the record in open court.
In a decision and order dated January 25, 1996, this court granted
defendant's motion to suppress certain evidence. In so doing the court
stated that it was constrained to suppress certain evidence. When the
court used the word constrained it was indicating disfavor with the re-
sult but recognizing its obligation under oath of office to follow the law
of this state and the [C]onstitution[s] of the United States and New
York State. It did so because the District Attorney conceded that the
search warrant was executed at night.
At the outset I want to applaud the candidness at oral argument of
the District Attorney in agreeing that the law as the court saw it in the
decision of January 25, 1996 was correct.
The Criminal Procedure Law provides that a warrant may only be
executed at night (that is between the hours of 9 [p.m.] and 6 [a.m.]) if
certain conditions are met. These are: (1) the application for the war-
rant must set forth reasons showing that there is a need to search at
night, and (2) the warrant must specifically authorize a nighttime
search.
In this case, the warrant did not permit a nighttime search; the
application for the warrant did not provide any reason for needing to
search at night; and the police officer did not request a nighttime
search. This court was therefore left with a choice [-] the choice of
following and obeying the law passed by the legislature of this state or
trashing the law. I chose to follow and obey the law. Neither this court
nor any other person is above the law.
In any event, the People have now moved to reargue and renew the
motion leading to the January 25, 1996 decision. It has become appar-
ent from the information the District Attorney has belatedly supplied
that the search did indeed take place during the hours that the Crimi-
nal Procedure Law regards as day. Moreover, the court has heard testi-
mony by Police Officer Forbes verifying the People's Claim. I find the
testimony credible. Defendant has offered nothing other than specula-
tion to contradict the sworn testimony. While no satisfactory explana-
tion has been offered by the District Attorney for the failure to present
this information at the outset, the interests ofjustice and the protection
of society mandate that the court reexamine its original decision.
It has become evident that the court's prior order was based upon
misinformation. In this regard, defense counsel sought suppression of
evidence alleging that the search impermissibly took place during a pro-
hibited time. He in fact had no basis for such a claim.
Thus the claim made in defendant's original motion is without
merit. Accordingly, I grant the District Attorney's motion to the extent
of granting renewal. Upon renewal and the hearing conducted this day,
this court's order dated January 25, 1996 is hereby modified so as to
deny suppression of the evidence in issue.
Justice David Friedman modifying, without written opinion, People v. Gardner,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 1, 1996, at 32 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 25, 1996) 1-3 (Feb. 6, 1996) (emphasis
in original) (copy on file with the New York City Law Review); see a/soJoseph P. Fried,
Evidence is Reinstated in a Brooklyn Rape Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1996, at B2.
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man deserved applause for both decisions. He did what the law
required in the first proceeding based on the evidence before
him. 120 Then he did what the new evidence warranted; he reversed
his first ruling based on the evidence before him. 2
Despite the fact that Justice Friedman did the right thing-
indeed, exactly what the law required in both decisions-he was
criticized by public officials. Governor Pataki called Justice Fried-
man's first decision 'just the latest demonstration that New York's
courts have gone too far in protecting criminal[s'] rights."'
122
Mayor Giuliani said "[t]his is a good illustration of how far people
will go to show the police are wrong.... Maybe the police are
right."1 2' The Mayor and the Governor should have apologized to
Justice Friedman after his second decision and congratulated him
on his actions. However, they chose not to. New York State Court
of Appeals Judge Vito Titone, outraged by the unfair attacks on
Justice Friedman, said, "[i]t was the last straw.... I know him. I
worked [with him] in the [a]ppellate [d]ivision. He [is] a fine law-
yer and a fine judge. To go after him on half the facts is so
wrong."124 The New York Times columnist Clyde Haberman com-
mented on what seemed to be "open season on judges,"125 saying
'Justice Friedman ... has fallen victim to what may charitably be
called a political and journalistic mugging. "126
When he seeks reappointment, does Justice Friedman have to
be concerned that he embarrassed Mayor Giuliani? I believe so.
What if Justice Friedman had not detected the Assistant District
Attorney's error with respect to the timing of the search? Would
the Mayor, incensed at the original decision granting the suppres-
sion motion, reappoint him? I do not believe so.
Governor Pataki introduced legislation,1 27 because of his dis-
tress with Justice Friedman's decision, that "would loosen search-
and-seizure rules for the police and prosecutors in New York by
120 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 710.60(2) (a) (McKinney 1995).
121 Id. § 710.60(3)(a)-(b).
122 Randy Kennedy, Ruling in Favor of a Suspect Puts State Judge Under Fire, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 2, 1996, at B3.
123 Id.
124 Lynette Holloway, Appeals Judge Says Colleagues Are Not Being Soft on Criminals,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1996, at 38.
125 Clyde Haberman, Under Fire, Judge Decides to Fire Back, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1996,
at B1.
126 Id.
127 S. 6041, 219th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1996). Governor Pataki's Po-
lice and Public Protection Act of 1996 (the "PPPA") failed to pass the New York State
Assembly.
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basing rules of evidence on [f] ederal [1] aws rather than more strin-
gent state standards."1 28 In responding to Judge Titone's remarks
attesting to Justice Friedman's character and ability, the Gover-
nor's spokesman said, "[t] he Governor believes Judge Titone is en-
titled to his opinion, but the [New York State] Legislature must
pass the Police and Public Protection Act in order to restore a sen-
sible balance between victims' rights and criminals' rights.... As it
stands now, criminals' rights too often come before victims'
rights."1" This would have been the appropriate time to acknowl-
edge that Justice Friedman correctly applied the existing law. The
Governor chose not to do so.
It is notjust public officials who are guilty of exerting pressure
against judges. Recently, U.S. District Court Judge Denny Chin
ruled that New York State's Sex Offender Registration Act,
13 0
known as Megan's Law, which mandates that the addresses of re-
leased sex offenders be made public,' cannot be applied retroac-
128 See Holloway, supra note 124, at 38. For example, the PPPA proposed to amend
the New York State Criminal Procedure Law to provide that:
when engaged in criminal law enforcement duties a police officer may
approach a person in a public place located within the geographical
area of such officer's employment when he has an objective, credible
reason not necessarily indicative of criminality, and to the full extent
permissible under the Constitution of this State and the United States
of America may ask such questions and take such other actions as the
officer deems appropriate.
S. 6041, 219th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1996).
129 See Holloway, supra note 124, at 38.
130 N.Y. CoRREcr. LAw §§ 168-168-v (McKinney Supp. 1996).
131 New York State's Sex Offender Registration Act provides that the names, ad-
dresses and other significant information of any person convicted of any "sex offense"
or any "sexually violent offense" be made public under the following circumstances:
(a) If the risk of repeat offense is low, a level one designation shall be
given to such sex offender. In such case the law enforcement agency
havingjurisdiction and the law enforcement agency having had jurisdic-
tion at the time of his conviction shall be notified pursuant to this
article.
(b) If the risk of repeat offense is moderate, a level two designation shall
be given to such sex offender. In such case the law enforcement agency
havingjurisdiction and the law enforcement agency having had jurisdic-
tion at the time of his conviction shall be notified and may disseminate
relevant information which may include approximate address based on
sex offender's zip code, a photograph of the offender, background in-
formation including the offender's crime of conviction, modus of oper-
ation, type of victim targeted and the description of special conditions
imposed on the offender to any entity with vulnerable populations re-
lated to the nature of the offense committed by such sex offender. Any
entity receiving information on a sex offender may disclose or further
disseminate such information at their discretion.
(c) If the risk of repeat offense is high and there exists a threat to the
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tively.1 3 2 The Daily News, in an outrageous attack, disagreed. Of
course, disagreement would be in order, but the language em-
ployed certainly was not. Leading off with the headline, "Perverts'
pal,"1 3 3 the Daily News wrote:
Because of him, the state cannot notify New Yorkers when most
sex offenders and pedophiles are living in their midst.
His junk justice ruling makes permanent his earlier deci-
sion to prevent the police from alerting the public about the
release of any sex fiend who was convicted before New York's
Megan's Law took effect Jan [uary] 21."'
V. CONCLUSION
The importance of maintaining an independent judiciary re-
quires an assurance to the judiciary that they will be appointed
without regard to political affiliations and obligations. Further-
more, assurances must be made that reappointments will come to
those found deserving by the two committees assigned the respon-
sibility of making such decisions.
I have praised Mayor Giuliani on many issues. I have dis-
agreed with him on many as well. I have never sought to court him
or seek his favor. I offered my advice to be helpful when asked for
my opinion. However, the Mayor's 3 5 interference is so outrageous
public safety, such sex offender shall be deemed a "sexually violent
predator" and a level three designation shall be given to such sex of-
fender. In such case, the law enforcement agency having jurisdiction
and the law enforcement agency having had jurisdiction at the time of
his conviction shall be notified and may disseminate relevant informa-
tion which may include the sex offender's exact address, a photograph
of the offender, background information including the offender's
crime of conviction, modus of operation, type of victim targeted, and
the description of special conditions imposed on the offender to any
entity with vulnerable populations related to the nature of the offense
committed by such sex offender. Any entity receiving information on a
sex offender may disclose or further disseminate such information at
their discretion. In addition, in such case, the information described
herein shall also be provided in the subdirectory established in this arti-
cle and notwithstanding any other provision of law, such information
shall, upon request, be made available to the public.
Id § 168-1(6)(a)-(c).
132 Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
133 Perverts' Pa DAILY NEws (New York), Sept. 26, 1996, at 44.
134 Id.
135 The Mayor does not stand alone. As this article has demonstrated, other politi-
cians and chief executives also threaten the independence of the judiciary.
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it must be condemned and is, regrettably, reflective of his charac-
ter. As Heraclitus said 2,500 years ago, "[a] man's character is his
fate." 13
6
136 JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 62 (1992).
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